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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
f'Jair1titt and Respondent, 
vs. 
Hl1WARD CUDE and ETTA MAY 
CUDE, his wife, No. 19294 
Defendants and Appellants, 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Pla1nt1ff sued as defendants, individuals identified as 
tor damayes resulting from alleged negligent use of 
water. However, inasmuch as plaintiff misnamed or 
1°1ssp<'lled the defendants' names (Cud£! instead of in both 
1 he summons and the pleadings, defendants believed they had no 
11uty to answer, plaintiff received a default judgment against 
Plaintiff then sought to execute on defendants 
; Defendants sought to stay proceedings, claiming in the 
alt,!tnalive, that because of the misnomer, the court had no 
,urisdiction over them, or that the default should be set aside, 
5nd that the case proceed to a trial on the merits. 
DISPOSITION _!!i LOWER COURT 
l'la1nt1ff originally brought suit alleging negligence on the 
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part of Howard Cud£ and Etta Ma!" Cudci in failinlJ to control 
irrigation water. Process 
indicated, defendants did not 
plaintiff secured a default 
property belonging to Howard 
was serveci on Ma£, Cud_s!. As 
answer because of the misnomer, and 
judgment and souljht to execute on 
and Etta May CudQ. The 
did not receive notice ot the default Judgment. 
Defendants' objected to plaintiff's actions (see Record, Pg. 
21), and requested the court to stay proceedings. Plaintiff 
responded by asking leave to either amend or to correct the 
spelling of defendants' names (Record, pages 23-27). Defendants 
responded to plaintiff's motion on Septemher 1, 1981 (Record, 
,Jage 31 l. 
Plaintiff was subsequently allowed to amend the spelling of 
cefendants' names on 
the defendants were 
30, and page 34). 
the summons and pleadings to indicate that 
Howard and Etta May (Record, page 
Plaintiff filed amended Findings of Fact 
(Record, page 35), Amended Default Certificate (Record, page 37), 
Amended Complaint (Record, page 38), Amended Return Service 
(Record, page 40), anu an A.mended Summons (Record, page 41). 
Defendants timely filed i1n Answer r1s1ng meritorious defenses 
(Record, page 42), a Motion t" Set Aside Amended Default (Record, 
page 47), together with SllppurtinlJ Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities (Record, pa',W Dcfc-nddnts' motion was supported 
by Affidavit (Record, [.Jagc )L). !J<:fE·nciants motion to set aside 
the dccfault Judg111,.,nt was cienic 0 d hy the trial court. Upon 
indication that ciefc!ndants appeal that ciction, pla1ntitl 
I " i' -2-
ti 1.-rJ a stipulation to set aside the default judgment (Record, 
bll), which stipulation remained for approximately six (6) 
',.c _ Meanwhile plaintiff attempted to garnish defendants' pay 
" k, etc. (Record, page 62-6 5), but was reminded of the 
(Record, page 
, fie cord, page 
Plaintiff 
66). 
6 7), and 
then sought to withdraw the stipulation 
Defendants objected to the withdrawal 
requested the court to rule and set the 
matter for trial (Record, page 68). Plaintiff supported its 
r.iot ion to set aside the stipulation with an Affid-avit and 
"'Prnnra nd um (Records, pages 6 9-7 9). Defendants responded to the 
c;,me with Memorandum and Affidavit (Record, pages 80-83). The 
criaJ court allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the stipulation to 
''-'l aside the judgment (Record, page 86). From said action, 
·10J cnlJ;ir1t s have appealed. 
As appellants, defendants seek in the alternative to either 
•ave the Judgment dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, or 
ti.at falling, to have the amended default judgment set aside, the 
stq_,ulation re-instated, and the case remanded to the trial court 
fnr an evidentiary hearing un the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 6, 1981, alleging that 
•l"[c-iidants • Cud§s • negligent use of irrigation water caused 
1•Lc1rit itt 's yard and basement to flood. As indicated above, the 
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defendants '"'ei-c named <·1- i•iPnt 1 f i hi ,,. II• ·.·::i1 c1 Curhi 2'nr1 r tta Mcie· 
Cud£. The helievec1 that ac; tl1e cnmµlaint, 
and other documents servE-'cl cltd not '·"rr<'ct ly name> them as ;Jarty 
defendants (see Return of Service, keconi, paCJ'"' 3 ), they did not 
have to respond. 
Default judgment was PntPred tor plaintiff against 
defendants Cud£, on June 8, 1981. The did not receive 
notice of the Default Judcjment of June 8, 1981. Plaintiff then 
sought to execute on proµerty helonging to Howcird and Etta May 
On June 29, lg 8], a n11 it 1 nn to stay Cl 1 J action as t c1 t !1e 
..._,a::=: f i 1 E'd hc-i· the· (_Jruu nrl s that the court had no 
jurisdc t J n , .. er t fit_ Ct c; '!fl(· i' l iJ i [I\ l f f r-esponded hy f i I 1 n· · 
motion to ame11d tr,E"- I l( cHllTHJ on P.,u_itE-,t 14, Hy t.1111u te 
Entry, on January 2, 1982, the court allowPd pla1ntitt to amenC 
the summons, plPa·::: l nc;c: and Jud QnH: n t , chan(_;ing the namp.c:. 0f 
defendants to Howarn r •1•1» and Etta May Cud§'. 
later formalizPd b\' arc"' l•·r (k•·L·nrd, page 34). 
aside thE:- ch_ fuult JU·l'_;'r1, r,t 
defendants ae:nJcn c-ir1J 
and allerdc::<1 rJ1'3ir.t · t 
meddling v.'1tr1 th1 r'( 
rnotinn tr_) c._,t ;:..cjrj, t' 
'1:1 t I 
ri h t. n1 a ry 3, l Y 8 2. 
i rr J '_;,1t i r1n w,jt ( t 
I. 
Thal c·nl ry was 
ln th1-1r 3ns ..... 1ct., 
'I h1 ()t t endants
1 
April, 1982, defendants' indicated to plaintiff's 
I' their intention to appeal. In response thereto, on 
J Y 8 2, plaintiff voluntarily filed with the court, his 
11 11 ·11 to set aside the default judgment and proceed to 
1 I. 11ci July 27, 1982, plaintiff once again attempted to 
;' u t on property belonging to defendants. On 
-c·i tr·mlwr 21, 1982, plaintiff gave notice of his withdrawal of 
I I L c;tq1ulation. Defendants objected to the withdrawal on 
On May 13, 1983, the court allowed plaintiff to 
.;lld1cJ,... the stipulation. 
f;. 
"· filed a notice of appeal on May 19, 1983. 
ARGUMENT 
"! ·1 i l 'Ii CUURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CUD£S 
I 1 "cc·ss must be served in accordance with the statutes or 
in 1•n1er for a court to have the power to adjudicate the 
lr1 q1Jt,st1on. Service must give each defendant notice that 
;+tsonal ly is being sued and that he/she must personally 
1H1'1 defend or suffer a default judgment. Meyers v. 
·' 1 •tn1C,t Utah 632 P.2d 879 (1981), Murdock v. 
al<;'.'., 2b lit ah 2d 22, 484 P. 2d 164 ( 1971). Without proper 
_, l \' l Ut<' court does not have personal jurisdiction over a 
C1 1 Lr l11l,1r1t, and without personal Jurisdiction, to support a 
lJ,,lt c•·rt1ticate, then the default judgment is void on its 
f"rn1c't 's Union Co-operative Royalty Co. v. Woodward, 
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Okla., 515 P.2d 1381 (1973). 
A defendant must be suecl by his true Christian name 
surname in full, if it is known or can he ascertained by 
plair.tiff. Generally, erroneous christian names and initials are 
considered irrevelant, unless are see 6 ALR3d 
1179 and 4 9 C. J. S. § 7 5 d. A misnomer generally cannot be taken 
advantage of after judgment. "However, it is recognized that if 
the error in name is such as to mislead the defendant so that he 
is not fairly apprised that he is the party the action was 
intended to affect, he may be relieved of his default." 59 AmJur 
2d §258. (Emphasis added). 
ln \'J_()()dl_ P!-Jr,oe", 2j 11tah 2d 24lJ, 461 P.2d 465 the 
·ourt held that an 1 ncorrect name on the endorsement by the 
_puicy sheriff on the su:-:irn•,nCo left w1 th defendant's 1><·1 fp, "would 
urely tend to mislead def(·r nt 2'S to whether or not he 
was the person requi rc.d to answer." [ 4 61 P. 2d at 4 6 6. ) The 
court held that because thP name was incorrect the service was 
fatally defective and the JU• nt entered was without force and 
effect. The court went c•n t• ld that by filing an answer and a 
-ounterclaim the defendant sutimi t ted to the court's jurisdiction 
l"ld the court should procc•c·cl 1-·itt. i'l ti-ial on the merits. 
In this case, pla1ntiti ci»n<>tr>d defendants as Howard Cud_cl 
and Etta Mae Cudd. Uef(' c did not know that "Cudd'1 mi:ant 
''Cude. 11 (See Affidavit nf Cude, Recnrd, page 52). The 
misspelling of MaJ'_ arlder1 t· th•.·ir cnnfusion. The exhibits were 
not attached to the Sf_' rved, creating still l'lure 
', 'n as to who the pa rt ies were and what the nature of the 
·111l 
were. Because of this confusion, the summons and 
Lor Cud_si were not adequate to give defendants 
thut they were being sued and must appear and defend or 
c;uftc'r a rlefault judgment. Therefore, the default judgment is 
v•1irl on its face for lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
deiendants. 
lI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO 
/,MEND THE SUMMONS, COMPLAINT AND JUDGMENT AFTER 
THJ: DF:FAULT JUDGMENT HAD BEEN GRANTED 
f'.s a rJeneral rule, amendments to the pleadings are favored 
o;l"'llld he· liberally permitted in the furtherance of justice. 
r,1; , , i Cul, the trial JUdge 's determination will be overturned 
r,rrly "-'C"on lhere is an abuse of discretion. Restrictions on the 
i'C•Wt,r ,,f the court to permit amendments requires only that the 
not substantially change the cause of action or affect 
, ant ive rights of the opposing party. The policy of 
[r·1m1tt1ny amendments with liberality is meant to promote trials 
merits rather than on mere technicalities. Haas v. -- -
Mutual Life ---- --- Insurance 
214 Kan. 747, S22 P.2d 
'38 I I ct 7 4), Frank v. Sullivan, 94 Ariz. SS, 381 p .2d S91 ( 196S)' --- -
r -p v. Fox, Colo. App., 640 p .2d 2S7 ( 1981)' Gillman 
,·, ti_a :_: 26 lit ah 2d 19 6 5' 486 p. 2d 1049 ( 19 71)' Meyers v. 
Jntr,t-l•c•st Cnrp_,_, Utah, 632 P.2d 879 (1981) 
!':•rely amendments to the pleading should be permitted where 
1!,. irt,tc·;·ts of JUStice so requires, and the adverse party is 
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given a fair opportunity to meet the newly raised matter. 
Consideration should be given to the c11sac1vantage or prejudice 
suffered by the adverse party as a result ot the amendment, 
Thomas & Inc. v. Lee Rock 30 Utah 
2d 187, 515 P.2d 466 (1973), Lewis v. Utah 627 P.2d 94 
(1981). 
In this matter, by allowing the amendment, i.e., to change 
defendants from Cud.£ to Cud:;,, the trial court placed defendants 
in an extremely prejudicial situation. They were suddenly 
parties to a suit in which a detault Judgment had already been 
entered. When the defendants were Cudg, Cu<i<>S were not parties. 
When defendants we, r_'uG§_. t r1t n they were parties ana 
they were not given an npportunity to answer or litigate the case 
This was c•xtremely prejudicial tc on its merits. 
defendants Cud:;,. Elecaus<' of the •.xtreme prejudice sutft>red by 
the defendants the pla1 nt ift 's amendment either should not 
have been allowed, or deienoz,nts answer should have been 
entered and the dispute heard on its merits. 
The policy behind 1 itJet-z,l Jy permitting amendments is tu 
promote a trial on the merits. In case, the nt-ipos1t(- result 
was achieved. 1h' aec1s1nn v-Jd.S mu(H_- nr1 a tt_,cr-1n1cctl1ty rather 
than on the merit" uf u,c case. 
permitting amendments w1tl1 J1t·•-'Lil1ty 
favor denying plaintiff's mot1rin tr· 
would grant the defendant'-- l_J()I· 
sa!lle and a trial of tht· i.ssul· 
tt1e pDlicy beh1nc 
Jul(:, in tt11s case, eitt1ct 
r,,, lJil(ifl al it, 
l t u n l t \ I ] t 
J l _ I '11'1\0PER AMENDMENT AFTER JUDGMENT 
Tile cwneral rule is that when a judgment has been entered, 
tr,c- <uurt is without authority to change it. Dairy Distributors, 
Inc., v. Union 976, Etc., 16 Utah 2d 85, 396 P.2d 47 
(1064), 1_n_ 1'._e_ Vilm's Estate, Colo., 299 P.2d 513 (1956), Malone 
v. Swift Meats 91 N.M. 359, 574 P.2d 283 (1978), 
t:i_<:>u_St()_ll v_._ Young, 94 N.M. 308, 610 P.2d 195 (1980). 
The only means by which a trial court may thereafter alter, 
amend or vacate a valid judgment is by an appropriate motion 
un<kr the Rules 59 and 60 U.R.C.P. Duponte Duponte, Hawaii, 
1'.L<i 537 (1971), Corturiendt v. Corturiendt, Colo., 361 P.2d 
Rule 59 (e) U.R.C.P., requires that the motion be 
served within 10 days after entry of judgment. Rule 60(a) 
li. I<. C. P. concerns the correct ion of clerical errors and { b) 
r_:'.'1nccrns fraud, etc. Neither the provisions of Rules 59 or 60 
,,ouJc1 seem to apply to this unusual fact situation. Plaintiff 
<110 riot make his motion to amend within 10 days, the error was 
nu1 ,_Jer1cal in nature, and plaintiff did not seek to be relieved 
'LHI' U1L- Judgment, yet the trial court allowed plaintiff to amend 
Because the customary time for amendments as 
cillowed under the U.R.C.P., had passed, plaintiff should not have 
l<µL-n al !"wed to amend the judgment. 
I<. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE 
1Hf DFfAULT JUDGMENT 
l>c·t au J t Judgments are not favored by the law and the courts 
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have a policy in favor of granting relief from rlefault JUdgmentc 
where there is any reasonable excuse, uncertainty or confusion 
unless will result in preJudice or work an injustice to the 
adverse party. Courts favor affording disputants a full and 
complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits. Westinghouse 
544 P.2d 876 (1975), Heathman and Clender:i.i_i:i_, 14 Utah 2d 
60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962), Utah Commercial.§'._ Saving_ Bank v. Trumbo, 
17 Utah 198, 53 P.1033 (1899), Locke v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 
285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
It is li1rc:iely within U1e discretion of the trial CCJUrt 
whether to relieve a µart'y itnm a default judgment. 
abuse of that discretion, the trial court's determination will 
not be disturbed. However, dc,urJts should be resolvced tn favor or 
setting aside the default J ucigme nt. Generally it is cons idei-ed 
an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where the re is any reasonable excuse or 
justification for the failure tri answer, and in the absence of 
prejudice to the opposing party. LI ta 1, 2d 
415, 303 P.2d 955 ( l 'J s 6)' Standard ------ c;1lsrin1tc Cu., H -------
Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 9SJ 1196.i), 1-Jestinghouse 
Co., v. Paul L. Larsen c::_r,11_t__t_il_('__tor, Inc., llL'lh 544 P.!'1 c"6 
(1975), Cutler v. I:l_ct_ys:<:'_Cf",, 32 Utah 3S4, 90 P. 8'!7 (JYUn, \',''"''' 
v. Dixon Ranch Co_._, 260 l'.2d 741 (1Y53l. II« !:_I• 
Rules of Civil Procedure: shoulrl lJrc l1tJrcrally corrslru<'l I' 
that there be a trial on 1ts mc·r1ts. 
- l lJ-
I '''' l'.2d 1114 (1956). 
I« ,HJsP of plaintiff's error in naming parties, defendants 
1 ,_,<I: rJ 1 r1 not answer the complaint and therefore suffered a 
cJ: tau l t Judgment because they reasonably believed that inasmuch 
as the summons and complaint served on them did not correctly 
name them as party defendants, they did not have to respond. 
This constitutes good cause for setting aside the default under 
Rule 55 (c) U.R.C.P. 
RPcause of plaintiff's misnomer, the lack of exhibits 
attached to the plaintiff's complaint served by plaintiff on 
Cw1;js, and the resultant confusion, the default judgment, in all 
t a J ! r' s r should be set aside on the grounds of excusable 
[See Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., Heatherman v. Fabian & 
C_l_"!nd_eri,2_r1_, 14 Utah 2d 60, 337 P.2d 189 (1962), Peterson, 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955).] 
nefendants filed an answer with the motion to set aside 
u,,, de-fault Judgment which sets forth a valid defense, which 
chefense would Justify a trial on the merits. 
\'. Corporation, Utah, 545 
Downey State Bank 
P.2d 507 (1976). 
f'Jn,nt 'ff will not be prejudiced by defendants presenting their 
1, ,,, t imate de tenses. Defendants Cud,!;_ have been prejudiced by 
misnamed and their defenses being ignored. 
of the facts of this case, it is in the interests of 
1 '"\ 1 ,-" and equity to set aside the default judgment and afford 
'!' [, ncLrnts the opportunity for a hearing on the merits. 
Ii- u J ,- h lJ ( h) u. R. c. p. ) 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRElJ !r, 1\LLllV;JNr; l'l.1\Jl;TJn I<> \\ITHllRi,v; 
HIS STIPULATION TO SU ASI m: THf llU AllLT cJllU1:1·11 [\"] 
Courts are generally h"und by st q1uL1t ions t11•twet-n parties 
unless points of law J u c1 i (, i al detenni nat inn art: 
involved. As with other ac:irec'mcnts, parties are hound by their 
stipulations, unless becausr0 of extenuating circumstances, etc,, 
the court sets aside the stipulation, or the parties mutually 
agree to withdraw the stipulation. A court has the power to set 
aside a stipulation intu inadvertently or for 
justificable cause. First of Ucr1vt_:r Investors v. C.N. 
Zundel, Utah, 600 P.2o 521 (]<1-;L;), f:l•·ir1 ''- lltah, 544 
472 ! Thompsc>n '::'._._ l'-l71 ( l 7 I. 
Plaintiff '" J Ll st 1 f 1 c d t i ()fl 
stipulation 0U1er than t< tht" record," tha.t thi:-'n_, \..'e:c 
"never an order entered 
neither party would "be pre1udiccd liy allowing the withdrawal." 
Defendants were pn -,ll'.CJ,_',_d tiy the withdrawal. 
believed their answer 
merits, and the court allow1nq lh< '-''llh<1rd,;al ct1an,d<:e<1 hat. As 
plaintiff's Justif1catinr' f•J1 stip1 t 1 C' r \>.'35 
inadequate to con st 1 tut,. 1uc.t lt CdlJ St· cic 
lot agree to the withc't,n:ioJ ulat1un to set CJ.Sidi':-' the_ 
rlPfault should be re-1 nc:t "' '": ,, '" t_ I, 
SUMMARY 
uµon the foregoing arguments, the appellants feel that 
I" l' • c1nn Pquity will best be served by remanding the matter to 
11,, 1 1 lal court, with directions to set aside the default, the 
,1cfri1Jlt JUdyment, accepting defendants' answer, and proceeding to 
'"',lt tht> controversy on its merits. 
1 !" day of DATEU this September, 1983. 
GEORGE E. MANGAN, APC 
Attorney for Appellant 
Roosevelt, Utah 
801-722-2428 
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,_, !'repaid, to JoAnn B. Stringham, McRae & DeLand, Attorney 
1, ',f-"•flrl<,nt, 1680 West Highway 40, Suite 1190, Vernal, Utah 
1,y neposit1ng the same in the United States Post Office at 
,,,,, J t , Utah. 
Secretary 
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